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Abstract 
In this paper, we use a social representational perspective to consider the interplay 
between pacifist attitudes and representations of armed conflicts. Specifically, we consider the 
social representations of World War I, an event that gave rise to a wide pacifist movement 
across the globe. Across 10 European countries (N = 1347 undergraduate students) we invited 
participants to report the first five words that came to mind when thinking about this event 
and measured their level of pacifism. A hierarchical classification analysis on the words 
revealed the presence of 7 lexical classes. Three of the classes highlight an “analytical” 
perspective on the war, with a focus on the places and actors of the war whereas three others 
highlight negative emotions and appraisals of the war. These six classes are well represented 
across the whole sample, which reveals the presence of a shared representation of the war but 
the last class is specifically associated with the Serbian subsample. Overall, pacifist attitudes 
are related to a view of the conflict in terms of negative evaluations, both at the emotional 
level and in terms of concrete consequences. Conversely lower pacifist attitudes are linked 
with an emphasis on weapons. This way of appraising the relation between shared 
representations of a major historical event and pacifism establishes a bridge between the 
mainstream approaches of attitudes relying on individual premises and the social 
representational theory. 
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100 Years After: 
What is the Relation Between Pacifist Attitudes and Social Representations the Great 
War? 
The question of the relationship between war and peace is not new. Whether we think 
of just war theory (jus bellum iustum) dating back to pre-Christian era or of the more recent 
concept of preventive war (already developed by Hugo Grotius, 1625/2012), this question 
seems to span cultures and ages. In psychology, it has been discussed in terms of people’s 
attitudes towards peace and war, attitudes being defined as “evaluations individuals hold 
towards elements in their environment” (Aronson, Wilson, & Akert 2005, cited by Sammut, 
2015, p. 97). Psychological research on this topic emerged in the 1930s, a period marked both 
by an unprecedented wave of pacifism and by the anticipation of a new impending conflict 
(see e.g., Chant & Salter, 1937; Droba, 1931; Farnsworth, 1937; Pihlblad, 1935). 
Concurrently, psychology has witnessed a growing interest for attitudes towards peace and 
war, accompanied with debates surrounding the very nature of this concept (see e.g., Bizumic, 
Stubager, Mellon, Van der Linden, Iyer, & Jones, 2013; Cohrs & Moschner, 2002; Van der 
Linden, Leys, Klein, & Bouchat, 2017; Nelson & Milburn, 1999). At the conceptual level, 
several authors agree to define the attitudes toward war as the moral evaluation of the use of 
war/violence as a way of resolving conflictual situations (see e.g., McAlister, Bandura, & 
Owen, 2006).  Correspondingly, attitudes toward peace involve the rejection of violence and 
acceptance of social harmony. 
While research on attitudes toward peace and war relies on a strong tradition and has 
yielded many publications, we strikingly know very little about people’s representation of its 
object. Yet, in order to evaluate an object, an individual naturally needs to have information 
about this object (see Moliner & Tafani, 1997). Considering the links between representations 
of war and attitudes towards peace and war will precisely be the focus of this paper.  
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A social representational perspective  
 We adopt a social representational perspective to address this question. Social 
representations are bodies of knowledge shared among group members. They help people 
make sense of the world (Moscovici, 2000) and contribute to the formation of the groups’ 
identities (Breakwell, 1993). Beyond referring to a specific concept, the social representations 
approach also offers a unique perspective on social psychological phenomena (Laszlo, 1997). 
Indeed, social representations are considered as being shared across minds rather than within 
them (Wagner & Hayes, 2005). In such perspective, the individual is “ontologically” part of 
the social sphere (Sammut, 2015) and the representational objet cannot be radically separated 
from the subject. This approach to social psychological phenomena is radically different from 
the more individualistic perspectives traditionally adopted in research on attitudes. Indeed, 
while social representations are primarily of a collective nature, the concept of attitude is 
grounded on an individualistic premise (Moliner & Tafani, 1997). Despite the variety of its 
definitions, the idea that an attitude is an attribute of the individual is widely accepted (for a 
review see Eagly & Chaiken, 2007). In this view, an attitude is clearly distinct from a social 
representation, both epistemologically and conceptually. Still, attitudes are addressed 
specifically in the social representational perspective. This is especially true of the socio-
dynamic approach of social representations.  
The socio-dynamic approach 
In the socio-dynamic approach, social representations are considered as produced by 
individuals and groups that occupy specific social positions (Doise, Clémence, & Lorenzi-
Cioldi, 1992). In such an approach, attitudes and social representations correspond to different 
levels of analysis. Social representations are a function of an ideological and collective level 
and concern the relations between a group and its social system (Salès-Wuillemin, Stewart, & 
Dautun, 2004). By contrast, an attitude is more of an individual nature and relates to the 
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interaction between an individual and its social system (Doise, 1982, 1985). The individual, 
depending on his position in the social system, possesses a specific perspective on a given 
object. This perspective will guide her evaluation of the object. In this view, an attitude can be 
considered as a specific position-taking individual makes (individual-level) inside a common 
frame of interpretation (societal-level).  
In summary, this approach constitutes a compelling way of appraising the nature of the 
relations between attitudes and their representational objects. It shows that attitudes and social 
representations, while concerning different levels of analysis, can be interpreted inside a 
common frame that is truly social psychological. In this view, far from being antagonistic, 
attitudes and social representations can be interpreted in a dialectic relation (see Van der 
Linden, Bizumic, Stubager, & Mellon, 2011). Attitudes toward an object are determined by 
the way an individual represents it (the common frame of interpretation) but his 
representation of the object will also be influenced by the way he evaluates it (from his 
position in the social system). But what do we know about attitudes toward peace and war and 
their representational object? 
 Representations of war and attitudes toward peace and war  
To date, to the best of our knowledge, the relation between representations of war and 
pacifist attitudes has received little attention in the social psychological literature. More 
precisely, the question was addressed in two articles. The first (Herrera & Reicher, 1998) 
investigates the categorization of the Gulf war by pro-war and anti-war undergraduate British 
students. When asked to rate images from the war featured in the press, pro and anti-war 
participants use different categories to characterize the same event. Pro-war students 
categorize war as opposing the civilized world to the Iraqi troops – embodied in the image of 
the dictator Saddam Hussein. By contrast, anti-war individuals interpret the Gulf War in terms 
of an opposition between ordinary people (humanity) and business and political leaders. The 
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second article addresses the question of the relation between attitudes toward peace and war 
and the representations of war – viewed here as a generic concept. Van der Linden and 
colleagues (2011) adopt a social representational approach. They first use a word association 
task in order to reveal the representations of peace and war held by the participants (Danish 
and American undergraduate students). Then, running hierarchical classification analysis, 
they distinguish between clusters of pro and anti-war attitudes. Finally, they show that while 
social representations of peace and war are only weakly related to the clusters based on the 
attitudes, pro and anti-war attitudes are linked with different representations. Pro-war attitudes 
are linked to representations of war such as bomb, necessary, aggression and dictatorship. By 
contrast, anti-war attitudes are linked with representations depicting war as associated with 
fear, poverty and hate.  
In summary, despite the small number of studies on the topic, we see that pro-war 
attitudes are linked with representations of the conflict as an opposition between the “civilized 
world” and an army of “villains” represented by a dictator. War is also perceived as a 
necessary evil. Finally, participants characterized by a high level of pro-war attitudes also 
represent the conflict by putting an emphasis on the weapons and linked to the idea of 
aggression. By contrast, anti-war attitudes are linked with representations of war as opposing 
Humanity to political and economic leaders. War is also linked to negative and aversive 
emotions and represented in terms of negative and concrete consequences. In the present 
paper, we also investigate the relation between attitudes toward peace and war and social 
representations of war. But rather than considering war in general, we focus on a conflict that 
constituted the matrix of pacifism in the 20th century and that influenced attitudes toward 
peace and war on a time scale never seen before: The First World War. 
Great War and Pacifism  
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On June 28 1914, Gavrilo Princip, a young Bosnian Serb, killed Franz-Ferdinand, heir 
to the throne of Austria-Hungary in Sarajevo. This event is the trigger of a war of a new kind, 
the First World War (WWI). Between 1914 and 1918, the Allies (mainly France, Russia, and 
the United Kingdom) confront the members of the Central Powers (mainly Austria-Hungary, 
Germany and the Ottoman Empire) in the first industrialized war. The conflict is 
characterized, among other aspects, by the extreme brutality of the trench warfare and the use 
of chemical weapons. After four years of fighting, the Central Powers are defeated. More than 
17 million peoples have died and the European continent is devastated.  
While WWI may share many features with other wars, it is idiosyncratic in many 
ways. An aspect of WWI that is of special relevance to this paper is its association with the 
rise of pacifism. Although the concept already existed before WWI (Cooper, 1991), the end of 
the war witnesses the rise of pacifism in many strands of society (Olivera & Offenstadt, 1993; 
Siegel, 2004). According to the French historian René Rémond (1984), the experience of 
suffering and atrocities of the war led individuals to massively adhere to pacifist ideas. Faced 
with catastrophe and the relative absurdity of the conflict, it soon became necessary to give 
meaning to the sacrifice of so many lives (Haddat, 2012). As a result, WWI was quickly 
reframed as the war to end all wars – at least for the victorious nations. During the interwar 
period, pacifist ideas were channelled in concrete political decisions. For example, members 
of the British Labour Party pleaded in favour of a unilateral disarmament while French 
Socialists voted for the suspension of military credits (Rémond, 1984). At the international 
level, the 1928 Kellogg-Briand Pact, signed by 63 countries, condemned the use of war to 
resolve conflicts (Josephson, 1979). This desire to avoid the disaster of the war later has 
contributed to the failure of the politics of appeasement towards the Nazi regime (Brock & 
Young, 1999). In this sense, the first global conflict constitutes the original matrix of 
pacifism. 
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Thus, WWI is historically linked with the rise of an important pacifist current. Further, 
recent evidence suggest that the first global conflict is also linked to the pacifist attitudes of 
young Europeans. More specifically, Bouchat and colleagues (2017) have shown that 
indicators of victimization at two distinct levels are linked to pacifist attitudes on a hundred 
years span. At the societal level, the death toll by country during the war is positively linked 
with the level of pacifist attitudes of the young Europeans. However, at the family level, the 
presence in their family of an ancestor who fought or died during the war is negatively 
associated with their endorsement of pacifist attitudes. In line with previous findings by 
Elcheroth (2006), the authors suggest that countries that faced strong war trauma would 
develop social representations valuing a peaceful coexistence. On the contrary, at the family 
level, resentment would remain present.  
Given the role of WWI in the emergence of pacifism, the association between 
representation of this conflict and pacifist attitudes is particularly interesting. Using the social 
representational approach sketched above and in line with the results of the two previous 
studies, we formulate the following hypotheses: 
According to the socio-dynamic approach, anti-war and pro-war individuals should 
possess different perspectives on WWI. More specifically: 
1. Anti-war attitudes are expected to be linked to negative evaluations of the 
conflict, both in terms of emotions and concrete consequences. They should 
also be linked to a set of representations opposing the "people" to the elites.  
2. Pro-war attitudes should be associated with representations of the conflict 
stressing the following aspects:  its necessity, a moral opposition between 
"good people" and villains, the view of war as a defence against an 
aggression, and an emphasis on military equipment. 
Method 
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1347 participants from 10 European countries took part in a large interdisciplinary 
survey between March 2014 and July 2015. These 10 countries included the main European 
actors of the war: Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Hungary, Italy, Russia, Serbia, Turkey 
and United Kingdom. The samples’ characteristics are provided in Table 1. This online 
survey designed by historians and social psychologists was presented to them in their 
language of education (questionnaires were translated and then back-translated from an 
original English version). The sample was composed of university students (63.4% women) 
whose average age was 23.37 (SD = 6.43). 56.6% of them were psychology students, 21.6% 
history students and 20.1% were students in other programs in social science. Distributions of 
gender and study program vary across subsamples (Gender: χ2 (9, N = 1346) = 144.5, p < 
.001; Study program: χ2 (18, N = 1325) = 492.4, p < .001). Besides demographics question, 
the questionnaire was composed of a large set of measures, most of which are not relevant to 
this paper (for a full description, see: 
https://osf.io/smuk8/?view_only=00d86911f44a403797f78743528d2939). We focus on the 
following measures:  
Social Representations of WWI. The first question of the survey aimed at appraising 
the social representations of the war of the participants. They were asked to write the first five 
ideas that came instantly to their mind when they thought about the First World War. This 
type of question is widely used in research on social representations, as it allows grasping a 
broader set of representations than pre-established scales, while being more easily translatable 
and amenable to coding than interviews (see e.g., Liu et al., 2005, see also Hilton & Liu, 
2008).  
Pacifism. The level of attitudes toward peace and war of the participants was 
appraised using the Attitudes Toward Peace and War Scale (Bizumic et al., 2013). This scale 
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is composed of 16 items such as “There is no conceivable justification for war” and “Our 
country's first priority should be world peace”. Although the scale is composed of two sub-
dimensions (Attitudes toward peace and Attitudes toward war), a factor analysis showed that 
the items highly loaded on one main factor. Such factor/dimension is characterized on one 
side by a high adhesion to peace and a rejection of war/violence and on the other side, by a 
positive evaluation of war and a low adhesion to peace. Therefore, we computed an indicator 
using the 16 items. Depending on the subsamples, Cronbach’s alphas vary from .79 to .89, 
suggesting a good internal consistency. Mean level and standard deviation of pacifist attitudes 
are provided for each sample in Table 1. 
Insert Table 1 here 
Results 
Social Representations of WWI 
Data were analysed using Iramuteq (Ratinaud, 2009), an interface of the R software, 
allowing for multidimensional content analyses. They were previously cleaned of 
misspellings and automatically lemmatised by the program (terms expressing a similar 
semantic content were aggregated: i.e., trench and trenches, slaughter and slaughtering). 
Among the 10,024 occurrences, 1695 active forms were found of which 53.16% were hapax 
(appeared only once).  
The first step of the analyses consisted in running a descending hierarchical 
classification analysis in order to investigate the structure of the representations of the war 
(see Reinert, 1983, 1990). This analysis reveals differences and proximities between lexical 
items. Seven lexical classes were automatically extracted (see Table 2)1. The three first 
classes – 1, 6 and 4 – are closely linked. They represent 17.5, 13.8 and 16.2% of the 
information respectively and focus mainly on the actors, objects, places and formal 
                                                 
1 We asked for a high number of classes at the end of the first round of analysis (20) in order to obtain detailed 
results. Aside from that, the defaults values of the program were maintained. 
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consequences of war. The category of the actors of war is composed of the generic figure of 
the fighter: “soldiers” and “poilus” (an informal name for the French soldiers during WWI) 
and by the names of the two main alliances: “Entente” and “Central Powers”. The places of 
war are composed of the names of two famous battles (Verdun and Isonzo) and the name of 
the continent where the most battles took place (Europe). More specifically, class 6 includes 
the artefacts of war (i.e., mustard-gas, rifle, machine-guns, shell) and finally, class 4 
emphasizes the formal consequences of the conflict (i.e., treaty, Trianon, end, Versailles, 
peace). These classes evidence representations of the war that are quite analytic and divorced 
from emotions as they focus mainly on formal aspects of the conflict, in a somehow detached 
way. These representations resemble experts' analyses. The second main lexical category is 
formed of classes 3, 2 and 5 (7.4, 13.3 and 16.4%). They share in common a global negative 
appraisal of the war. The three classes are composed of negative evaluations (i.e., slaughter, 
horror, chaos), negative emotions (i.e., fear, sadness, affliction) and concrete negative 
consequences of the war (i.e., hunger, destruction, poverty). However, each class is quite 
specific. Class 3 focuses on a moral evaluation of the war (i.e., injustice, history, politics, 
stupidity). Class 2 emphasizes the negative consequences (i.e., poverty, destruction, death, 
victim) and emotions (i.e., sadness, hate, sorrow, mourn) and finally, class 5 seems 
characterized by the concrete and negative conditions of the conflict (i.e., blood, hunger, pain, 
wound, cold). In summary, these three classes are composed of social representations of the 
war that seem of mainly negative valence. Finally, class 7 is characterized by elements 
associated with the Serbian experience of the war: the name of the Serbian murderer of the 
Austro-Hungarian archduke, name of a famous battle of the Serbian army (i.e., Cer) and bases 
of operations in Greece (i.e., Salonika, Corfu).  
Insert Table 2 here 
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The descending hierarchical classification analysis not only reveals classes, but also 
their interrelations and their links with illustrative variables. It shows that some classes of 
representations are more or less linked with specific variables (i.e., gender, nationality, status 
of the country during WWI, type of study). We observe that there are two basic groups of 
classes – the “negative valence” and the “analytical” classes – and a single additional one – 
class 7 (see Table 3). Class 7 is the least central one and is characterized by an 
overrepresentation of Serbian participants (see Table 3). The lexical classes seem therefore 
associated with specific nationalities. For instance, the participants of the former allied 
countries (the Entente) are overrepresented in classes 1 (analytical), 3 (moral evaluation). By 
contrast, several countries belonging to the ex-Central powers are found in classes 4 and 6 
(the analytical classes; see Table 3). Other illustrative variables are also related to specific 
classes: psychology students are overrepresented in classes 2, 3, 5 (negative evaluation) and 1, 
while history students are preferentially found in class 4. Finally, women are overrepresented 
in the three “negative evaluation” classes and in class 1 and men in two out of the three 
“analytical” classes. The overrepresentation of women in the “negative evaluation” classes is 
consistent with the findings of previous studies. For instance, Sarrica (2007) and Van der 
Linden et al., (2011) show that to some extent, females tend interpreting war more in terms of 
negative emotions and negative consequences than their male counterparts. Such effect would 
be linked to the perception of the classical social roles and stereotypes associated with women 
and the image of the war as mainly led by men (see also Nincic & Nincic, 2002). The analysis 
of the links between representations and illustrative variables shows that the representations 
are not uniformly shared across individuals and cultures. However, it is not the purpose of the 
present paper to highlight such relation but to appraise their link with pacifist attitudes.  
Insert Table 3 here 
Social Representations and Pacifist Attitudes 
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 In order to appraise the links between pacifist attitudes and social representations, we 
divided participants in two categories based on the median of the pacifist scale (Mdn = 5.50, 
M  = 5.40, SD  = .95). This allows us to distinguish the 50% of the participants who are the 
most pacifist from the other half. Given that the median is quite high, we have to keep in mind 
that we probably distinguish between the most pacifists and the other half of participants, who 
are less pacifistic but still probably not militaristic neither. Finally, the median split was 
performed on the whole sample, regardless of the nationality of the participants. We opted for 
this choice because our aim was the analysis of the relation between attitudes and 
representations regardless of nationality. We first appraised the link between pacific attitudes 
and the seven classes highlighted in the previous analysis. Although effects are small 
(moderate), pacifist attitudes are related to social representations of WWI. This result suggests 
that high pacifists and low-pacifists occupy different positions in the representational field of 
WWI (see Table 2). 
More specifically, high pacifists are overrepresented in class 2 (χ2 (1, N = 1347) = 6.6, 
p = .01) and in class 3 (χ2 (1, N = 1347) = 8.7, p = .09; trend). Consistent with Hypothesis 1, 
it shows that high pacifists seem to view the conflict more in terms of negative evaluations, 
both at the emotional level (sadness, hate, sorrow) and in terms of concrete consequences 
(poverty, destruction, death, mourn). However, it is not clear if the opposition between leaders 
and masses can be found in one of these two classes despite the reference to negative moral 
evaluations (i.e., injustice, stupidity) and the word “politics” in class 3. Conversely, low 
pacifists are more present in class 6 (χ2 (1, N = 1347) = 5.5, p = .02). In line with Hypothesis 
2, this result shows that lower pacifist attitudes are linked with representations of weapons 
(mustard-gas, rifle, machine-guns, shell). However, there is no mention of the necessity of the 
conflict and of the opposition between good and villains2.  
                                                 
2 When performed on three groups of pacifists (corresponding to the three main percentiles) instead of two, 
the analyses reveal highly similar results. High pacifists are overrepresented in “negative evaluation” classes 
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Next, an analysis of the specificities was run in order to appraise the representations 
that were the most associated with pacifist attitudes. This allows finding the words on which 
high pacifists and low pacifists are most differentiated. High pacifists are associated with 
representations of the war stressing its negative consequences (poverty, casualty) and the 
concrete conditions of the fight (bomb, blood, cold). Still, there is no mention of the 
opposition between leaders and masses and of the negative emotions. By contrast, low 
pacifists are characterized by representations of consequences of war (victory, treaty) that are 
of a more positive and political nature, by more detached representations of the fight (warfare, 
Verdun), the figure of the emperor and weapons (weapon, shell). In this case, while the 
mention of the weapons is still present, low pacifists focus especially on analytical and more 
detached representations of the war.  
Discussion 
We opened this paper by exposing a gap in the literature on attitudes toward peace and 
war. While the field is well developed and anchored in a long tradition of research, little is 
known about the representational objects of these attitudes. Starting from the obvious premise 
that in order to be able to evaluate something, one has to have a representation of it – we 
investigated the relation between pacifist attitudes and the social representations of WWI. To 
our knowledge, the first global conflict is particularly appropriate to study this relation given 
its strong historical links with the pacifist wave and its lasting impact on current pacifist 
attitudes.  
Building on a large and diversified sample, the present study provides evidence that 
pacifist attitudes are linked with social representations of the Great War. In line with previous 
findings (see Herrera & Reicher, 1998; Van der Linden et al., 2011), our results show that 
high levels of pacifist attitudes are linked with negative evaluations of the war and a focus on 
                                                                                                                                                        
while low pacifists are slightly overrepresented in “analytical classes”. Mid pacifists are not overrepresented in 
any lexical class. 
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its concrete and negative consequences. The emphasis is placed on the outcomes of the 
conflict but none of them being of strategic or political nature. This way of representing WWI 
is similar to what Rémond (1984) and later Haddat (2012) described as having led to the 
development of the pacifist current: “As the call to co-operate with the enemy is unlikely to 
be heard, it is the horrors of war that are invoked in an attempt to "visualize" warlike 
violence” (Amossy, 2012). In this case, the pacifist wave of the interwar period and current 
pacifist attitudes seem associated to a similar interpretation of the conflict. This finding does 
not prove that social representations of the conflict in the direct post-war period are identical 
to the current ones but still suggests that a common interpretational framework underlies the 
view of the conflict associated with the pacifist wave that emerged a hundred years ago and 
current pacifist attitudes. Further, students who are characterized by the highest level of 
pacifist attitudes seem to interpret WWI mainly through a moral and emotional prism. Such a 
result suggests that rejection of war would be associated much more with emotional and 
moral representations than with macrosocial and political arguments. By contrast, the less 
pacifist students represent war in a more detached and analytical way than their high pacifist 
counterparts. In this case, the representations that they share seem to be more a matter of 
knowledge than a matter of feelings or morality. Still, less pacifist students do not mention 
positive aspects of the war and do not glorify it. Broadly speaking, the less pacifist students 
show that they know things about the Great War, especially the famous battles, political 
consequences and weapons used at that time.  
While most of our findings are consistent with those of previous studies, some results 
are not in line with our hypotheses. First, we did not find a clear representation of the conflict 
as opposing elites to the masses among the representations shared by high pacifists. This 
finding is surprising given the fact that the narrative of WWI as a sacrifice of the masses is 
highly present (at least in part of the population) since 1925 (see e.g., Standaert, 2013). 
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Moreover, this opposition is one of the key results of a recent study by Bouchat and 
colleagues (2017; see above) on a similar sample and that shows that the representation of the 
war as an opposition between elites and masses is widely shared across European countries. 
The absence of such a representation (even if we see mentions of the words “politics” and 
“injustice”) could be explained by the formulation of the questions asked to the participants. 
These do not allow for elaboration and did not focus on the causes of the war (contrary to 
Bouchat et al., 2017). Indeed, participants were asked to write down only one or a few words 
that came to their mind when thinking about WWI. Second, it was hypothesized that less 
pacifist students would associate war with necessity. This prediction was not supported. This 
result highlights that findings about representations of the war as a generic concept (e.g., such 
as Van der Linden et al., 2011) do not necessarily apply to representations of specific 
conflicts. In retrospect, this is not surprising if one considers that WWI – at least in most 
European countries – is the archetype of the war that wasn’t necessary. Finally, we did not 
find any representation of WWI as opposing good people and villains. Once again, this could 
be the result of the type of question asked that did not leave much space for elaboration. 
Further, this result can be understood at least partially by looking at the historical evolution of 
the representations of the conflict. Since the Locarno Treaty in the twenties, WWI tends to be 
less interpreted as having opposed good people and villains, but rather as a conflict where 
masses were all victims. The narrative of reconciliation promoted by European integration 
(see e.g., Haas, 1958) could also have influenced this perception. In summary, the present 
results suggest that, even if its social representations are weakly linked with current attitudes, 
WWI can still be interpreted as a matrix to which pacifist attitudes are linked. In doing so, our 
study contributes to the understanding of the relation between pacifist attitudes and their 
representational objects, and helps filling a gap in the literature on the topic. 
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 Further, by highlighting the collective nature of the representations of war, the social 
representational approach allows replacing the study of some aspects of the attitudes in a 
multilevel perspective. Indeed, we showed that the evaluations an individual makes about 
peace and war – her attitudes – are linked at least to some extent to representations that are 
shared at the societal level (inside a common frame of interpretation).  
In addition to its specific focus on the links between attitudes and representations, the 
present study is one of the firsts that addresses the question of the social representations of the 
Great War in psychological science. Using content analysis, we showed that young European 
students from ten countries are sharing similar representations of the Great War. Even if it 
wasn’t the aim of the study, this is the first time that the representational field of WWI is 
highlighted on such a scale. Moreover, in line with the socio-dynamic approach (see Doise, 
Clémence, & Lorenzi-Cioldi, 1992) and even if we didn’t develop this aspect in the present 
paper, we showed that individuals occupy different positions in this representational field 
depending on their gender, nationality and social category. As such, these results constitute a 
primary source of information for scientists working on the memory of distant wars. 
Limitations 
 While the present study offers new insights on the relation between attitudes and 
social representations, it is characterized by several limitations. The first resides in the 
composition of the sample of participants (see Henrich, Heine, & Norenzayan, 2010). It is 
composed of university students (mainly psychology and history), both more educated and 
potentially more in contact with other cultures (due to the Erasmus-type programs) than other 
members of their generation. As such, the contact with a more globalized culture could 
influence their representations of the conflict. However, given the majority of psychology 
students and the fact that historians are undergraduate, we have good reasons to think that 
their representations of WWI are closer to the ones of lay individuals than the ones of experts. 
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Moreover, sample sizes aren’t similar across countries. This could influence the set of 
representations highlighted given the differences of weight of each sample in the factorial 
analyses. Second, the nature of the question aimed at appraising the social representations of 
the conflict can have limited the variety of representations presented by the participants. 
Indeed, the question was designed for short answers (a word or a few) and did not allow for 
more elaboration. For instance, it wasn’t possible to catch narratives that could have revealed 
more nuanced representations of the conflict. However, we endorse the choice of limiting the 
length of the answers, given the need to translate the answers from ten countries into English 
in order to run the content analysis. Finally, having split the sample at the median level of 
pacifist attitudes resulted in one main issue. Given the high level of the median (5.5 on a 1 to 
7 scale), we distinguished between very high pacifist individuals and less pacifist others, but 
still most of them being in favour of peace. As a result, we found interesting information on 
the relations between high pacifist attitudes and social representations of war but far less info 
on the links with pacifist attitudes. We tried to overcome this issue by dividing the sample 
into three groups as a function of their level of pacifist attitudes. In this case, results are 
highly similar than the ones we obtained with two groups. Further, studies on participants that 
are more likely to approve war (e.g., students in a military school) would be welcome. 
Conclusion 
To our knowledge, the present paper constitutes the first attempt at investigating the 
links between attitudes and social representations in a large sample of Europeans students. 
Using a social representational approach, it helps filling a gap in the literature on attitudes 
toward peace and war by highlighting their links with specific representations of a conflict. 
Doing so, it establishes a bridge between the mainstream approaches of attitudes relying on an 
individual premise and social representational theory. In addition, the present study offers the 
first overview of how young Europeans represent the Great War a hundred years after the 
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event. The highlighting of such results constitutes a plea in favour of the study of the social 
representations associated with specific historical events.
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Table 1.  
Sample Characteristics and Level of Pacifist Attitudes. 
Country N 
% 
Women 
Pacifist Attitudes 
Mean & (SD) 
Austria 125 68 5.73 (.78) 
Belgium  215 71.2 5.35 (.84) 
France 99 78.8 5.38 (.77) 
Germany 134 30.6 5.01 (1.13) 
Hungary 100 58 5.32 (.93) 
Italy 117 80.3 5.62 (.89) 
Russia 116 80.2 5.08 (.95) 
Serbia 304 57.9 5.59 (.96) 
Turkey 74 75.7 5.64 (.90) 
United Kingdom 63 31.7 4.82 (.93) 
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 Table 2. 
Illustration of the Structure of the Social Representations of World War I Across 10 European 
Countries 
Class 7 Class 3 Class 2 Class 5 Class 1 Class 6 Class 4 
15.4% 7.4% 13.3% 16.4% 17.5% 13.8% 16.2% 
Gavrilo 
Princip 
(334.24) 
Horror 
(141.96) 
Poverty 
(153.14) 
Blood 
(186.87) 
Dead 
(199.14) 
Warfare  
(133.37) 
Treaty 
(246.98) 
Salonika 
(262.99) 
Injustice 
(138.21) 
Destruction 
(121.23) 
Hunger 
(153.6) 
Trench 
(136.9) 
Trench 
(107.88) 
Entente 
(156.79) 
Cer 
(235.9) 
Human 
(82.66) 
Death 
(91.41) 
Fear 
(61.91) 
Poilu 
(128.45) 
Verdun 
(103.42) 
Trianon 
(146.46) 
Albania 
(176.41) 
History 
(71.85) 
Sadness 
(84.93) 
Death 
(58.93) 
Soldier 
73.95) 
Mustard-Gas 
(80.01) 
Monarchy 
(140.33) 
Front 
(171.57) 
Politics 
(67.3) 
Victim 
(66.73) 
Power 
(55.55) 
Germans 
(59.78) 
Slaughterhouse 
(55.7) 
End 
(97.87) 
Austro-
Hungary 
(167.13) 
Stupidity 
(62.69) 
Hate 
(52.8) 
Pain 
(46.95) 
Europe 
(59.17) 
Rifle 
(50.46) 
Versailles 
(73.11) 
Corfu 
(123.97) 
Past 
(50.1) 
Suffer 
(45.14) 
Innocent 
(46.2) 
1914-1918 
(56.13) 
Shock 
(44.1) 
Positional 
(51.15) 
Golgotha 
(122.51) 
Slaughter 
(47.85) 
Mourn 
(32.89) 
Wound 
(35.85) 
Great 
(53.15) 
Schlieffen-plan 
(43.12) 
Isonzo 
(41.66) 
Albanian 
(112.45) 
Chaos 
(46.41) 
Violence 
(32.56) 
Affliction 
(35.85) 
War 
(45.38) 
Machine-guns 
(37.76) 
Peace 
(41.63) 
Battle 
(96.71) 
Resistance 
(38.53) 
Sorrow 
(26.29) 
Cold 
(34.73) 
Conflict 
(34.08) 
Shell 
(36.89) 
Central-Powers 
(40.27) 
Note: the numbers in brackets are chi-square values; χ2 indicates the strength of the link 
between the variables and the classes. 
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Table 3. 
Links between Illustrative Variables and Main Classes 
Classes                Illustrative variables 
  National/International Studies/Gender 
1 France (113.14), Belgium (82.03), Entente (47.59), Italy 
(18.52) 
Psychology (47.55), Women (13.04) 
2 Austria (9.14), United Kingdom (7.37), Italy (5.36) Women (13.85), Psychology (13.56) 
3 Belgium (21.32), Entente (8.18) Psychology (12.94), Women (4.56) 
4 Central powers (137.42), Hungary (70.86), Austria 
(59.63), Germany (10.6) 
History (33.01), Men (7.67) 
5 Russia (65.64), Turkey (23.67), Hungary (16.72), 
United Kingdom (10.48) 
Women (23.03), Psychology (8.53) 
6 Germany (133.13), Central Powers (51.72) Men (41.5), History (8.21) 
7 Serbia (473.84), Entente (79.24) Men (22.12), History (15.35) 
 
Note: the numbers in brackets are chi-square values; χ2 = strength of the link between the 
variables and the classes. 
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